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51 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW  
EN BANC 
________________________________________________________________________ 




Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Company Accounting Oversight 
Board 
Peter L. Strauss* 
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, 
Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(“PCAOB”) under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), with President Bush‟s support. Its purpose was 
to replace deficient accounting industry self-regulation with effective 
external regulation. The choices it made in doing so engendered 
passionate arguments about constitutionally necessary presidential 
authority and separation of powers. These divided the D.C. Circuit 2-
11 and will be rehearsed before the Supreme Court in the coming 
weeks. President Bush‟s administration defended those choices; Judge 
Rogers, writing for the majority, found no valid constitutional 
objection to them (albeit not without some difficulty). On the other 
side, petitioners the Free Enterprise Fund and Judge Kavanaugh in 
dissent marshaled strong arguments that, if accepted in their entirety, 
 
 *  Betts Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks for able research assistance to Andrew 
Amend, 08. 
 1. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442879
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would put the constitutionality of a wide range of government 
institutions in shadow. Starting with the constitutional text, and 
seeming almost to regard the cases as a nuisance to an intermediate 
court judge, Judge Kavanaugh‟s opinion is an open invitation to the 
originalists on the Court.2 The grant of certiorari, after extensive 
filings venturing far more deeply into the merits of the case than, in 
the writer‟s experience, is generally supposed to happen, suggests that 
the newly reconstituted Court could well prove sympathetic.  
Perhaps because both majority and dissent invoked my 
analysis of the constitutional issues respecting independent regulatory 
commissions published a quarter-century ago,3 the editors of the 
Vanderbilt Law Review invited me to write this preliminary essay, 
setting before you the issues in the case. On or about November 2, you 
will find in this space four essays from law professors long associated 
with the constitutional issues in the case and chosen for the likelihood 
they will prove to be in intelligent disagreement: Harold Bruff 
(Colorado), Steven Calabresi (Northwestern), Gary Lawson (Boston), 
and Rick Pildes (NYU). In early December, all five of us will post 
responsive essays. Once the Court has published its opinion(s) on the 
case, some or all of us may also offer a brief appraisal. Our 
instructions are to limit our essays to no more than five thousand 
words—quite a challenge even for table-setting, when one considers 
that the D.C. Circuit opinions run almost fifty pages in the Federal 
Reporter, and the certiorari filings alone are almost four times as long. 
While all the parties agree that the PCAOB is to be considered 
a “government entity,” it is in many respects—and not only those that 
excited this litigation—an odd duck. Its five members each earn a 
salary considerably higher than is paid to any person we might 
usually think a government official, including our President.4 Its 
employees are free of the salary restrictions and other characteristics 
of the civil service system. The expense of maintaining them, like the 
PCAOB‟s program generally, is not met by annual appropriations 
under the Constitution‟s arrangements for reserving to the legislature 
the “power of the purse.” Rather, those expenses are paid by fees 
 
 2. Judge Kavanaugh appears to enjoy extending invitations to explore quiescent legal 
questions of large constitutional dimension. See SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Cong., 571 
F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (constitutionality of the 
Copyright Royalty Board). 
 3. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984). 
 4. The PCAOB Chair‟s annual salary is $673,000 and other members‟, $547,000, “roughly 
four times greater than those of their alleged „superiors‟ at the SEC.” Brief for Petitioners at 49-
50, Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, No. 08-861 (U.S. July 27, 2009). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442879
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collected from both the accounting industry the PCAOB regulates and 
the public companies the industry audits, all in accordance with a 
budget approved not by Congress but by the SEC. If concededly a 
“government entity,” the PCAOB is not a “government agency” whose 
activities are subject to, and made judicially reviewable by, the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act.  
In some of these respects—one might add, respects that are not 
prominent in the litigation—the PCAOB is not alone. The Postal 
Service, the Federal Reserve and its member institutions, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Bonneville Power Authority are 
among the mixed-character “government entities” Congress has 
created over the years. 
In certain respects, too, the PCAOB resembles quasi-public 
institutions that since 1938 have regulated investment activities in 
the shadow of the SEC, like stock exchanges and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”). In that year, the Maloney 
Act5 permitted any securities association that registered with the SEC 
to discipline its members for violating the organization‟s rules, but 
such discipline was subject to the plenary supervision of the SEC.6 
This delegation of authority to these organizations was done in the 
interest of promoting self-regulation. Subsequent changes both 
expanded the self-regulatory organizations‟ authority, to permit their 
enforcement of SEC as well as their own regulations, and enhanced 
the SEC‟s oversight,7 “to ensure that there is no gap between self-
regulatory performance and regulatory need.”8 While these 
organizations control the bringing of disciplinary actions, any ultimate 
discipline they impose is subject to plenary review by the Commission, 
which is free to substitute its judgment as to both policy and facts.9 
Their activities are diverse and important and their expertise 
substantial, supplying disciplinary resources the federal government 
could not easily afford.10 In many respects, the PCAOB-SEC 
 
 5. Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938). 
 6. R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 7. E.g., Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) 
(expanding the SEC‟s authority over self-regulatory organizations). 
 8. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 181.  
 9. For a general consideration of this scheme, see NASD v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 805-07 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), on which this paragraph generally relies. 
 10. Consider the following language drawn from a graphic display from the 2008 Annual 
Report of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, which in 2007 displaced both the New 
York Stock Exchange and the NASD as the “self-regulatory organization” for their memberships: 
FINRA Regulatory Actions in 2008. FINRA is empowered by the federal government 
to protect American investors from fraud and bad practices. In 2008, FINRA took 
vigorous enforcement action against firms and brokers who harmed investors: [(1)] 
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relationship was modeled on these established institutional 
relationships. One might think differences were created in the 
interests of both closer SEC control and avoidance of self-interested 
self-regulation. It is these differences that fuel the constitutional 
issues in the PCAOB case. 
The New York Stock Exchange, the NASD, and now the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) operate under 
SEC review, but they control their officers and budget. Those 
institutions adopt their own rules of discipline and practice, albeit 
subject to standards the SEC will enforce on its review of individual 
disciplinary proceedings. The PCAOB is much more tightly under SEC 
control. Its budgets and the fees that support them must be approved 
by the Commission. The rules it enforces are subject to Commission 
approval and displacement. Its leadership is appointed by the 
Commission to fixed terms of office, and that leadership can be 
terminated prematurely by the Commission only on a finding of 
“cause” on one of three specified grounds, two of which require 
“willful” misconduct in office.  
Yet the SEC itself, as an independent regulatory commission, 
has only a limited relationship with the President, who by our 
Constitution is vested with the executive power and is responsible to 
see that all federal laws “be faithfully executed.” Its Commissioners, 
too, serve fixed terms and may be removed by him only “for cause.” 
The President‟s capacity to supervise its policymaking is, at best, 
untested. If Congress in creating the PCAOB made it—unlike the New 
York Stock Exchange, the NASD, and the FINRA (or for that matter, 
the American Bar Association, lawyers‟ self-regulatory organization)—
so close to the SEC as to have become “a government entity,” did it fail 
to recognize the President‟s constitutionally required place in 
American government? 
The Constitution‟s text expects that there will be government 
departments, but says nothing about them or their authority beyond 
requiring their heads to be appointed by the President with senatorial 
confirmation, and to have an obligation to give the President, on his 
demand, a “written opinion” about the manner in which they will 
exercise their (necessarily statutory) duties. One must stand in awe of 
 
Collected more than $28 million in fines from individual brokers and firms[; (2)] 
Ordered or secured agreements to return more than $1 billion to investors[; (3)] 
Expelled or suspended 19 firms, barred 363 individuals from the industry and 
suspended 321 others[; and (4)] Reviewed nearly 100,000 individual communications 
from firms to investors, resulting in 476 investigations. 
FINRA, REFORMING REGULATION TO BETTER PROTECT INVESTORS 4 (2009), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p119061.pdf. 
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the variety of designs Congress has created over our history in 
fulfilling its need to create the “necessary and proper” institutions of 
American government—and, as well, of the infrequency and 
clumsiness with which the Supreme Court has addressed the 
propriety of its choices. The first Congress created officials in the 
Treasury Department whose statutory responsibilities were more to 
Congress than to the President. Congress soon had chartered the 
United States Bank—close to being, if it was not precisely, a 
“government entity”—with enormous sway over the national economy. 
By 1852, as the recent scholarship of Jerry Mashaw has called to our 
attention,11 it had created a collective of Supervising Inspectors of 
steamships, also loosely connected with the Treasury Department, 
that effectively introduced the first essentially independent regulatory 
body to the government menagerie. There followed the Federal 
Reserve Bank with its dependencies, the alphabet soup of 
“independent regulatory commissions,” powerful government 
corporations like the TVA or the Postal Service, single-headed 
agencies with fixed terms of office not coincident with presidential 
administrations (notably, the Social Security Administration), the 
independent special prosecutor, and so on. 
Although these congressional structures answer often to 
congressional appreciation of the need for institutional distance from 
raw politics (but perhaps also to an impermissible congressional 
preference to substitute its own supervision of “faithful execution” for 
the President‟s), few of them have come to the Supreme Court, and 
fewer have been disapproved. Clearly established are some principles 
safeguarding against congressional aggrandizement of its own role. 
Congress cannot confer on itself a function in appointment to12 or 
removal from13 executive office beyond senatorial confirmation and 
impeachment, or create mechanisms for disapproving executive action 
other than by enacting statutes or withholding appropriations.14  
What Congress is authorized to do in regulating the President‟s 
relationships with the agencies it creates is much less clear. In 1926, 
after holding the case over for reargument, a bare majority of the 
Supreme Court wrote Myers v. United States15 using language that 
many have taken to support strong versions of the President‟s 
 
 11. Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from 
Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568, 1638-41 (2008).  
 12. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-28 (1976). 
 13. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725-27 (1986). 
 14. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-59 (1983) (holding the one-House legislative veto 
unconstitutional). 
 15. 272 U.S. 52, 107, 122 (1926). 
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necessary role, but in a context in which the Senate had tried to 
require its own approval of the removal of an executive official from 
office. Not a decade later, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,16 
the Court wrote unanimously (and promptly after argument) that 
Congress could make a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) 
Commissioner‟s five-year term of office safe from earlier presidential 
termination unless “for cause,” albeit while pretending that this was 
because the FTC performed no significant executive function.17 Half a 
century later, in Morrison v. Olson,18 seven of eight Justices, with only 
Justice Scalia dissenting, approved Congress‟s post-Watergate 
creation of the office of independent counsel. Appointed by a special 
judicial panel, and under only limited supervision by the Attorney 
General, the independent counsel was responsible for investigating 
and possibly prosecuting high executive officials—even the 
President—suspected of crime. No one could or did pretend that the 
independent counsel performed no significant executive function; the 
majority, rather, concluded that the possibility of the Attorney 
General‟s removing him “for cause,” and his obligation ordinarily to be 
governed by general Department of Justice policies created a 
constitutionally sufficient relationship to the President—a totality-of-
the-circumstances conclusion with which Justice Scalia violently 
disagreed. It is fair to say that Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison—
the latter especially—will be under significant pressure in the 
Supreme Court‟s consideration of this case. 
Congress‟s authority to structure executive appointments 
(beyond the ban on its own participation other than Senate 
confirmation) is remarkably murky in the cases. “Principal” officers 
require presidential nomination and confirmation by the Senate. The 
Constitution permits Congress to assign the appointment of “inferior” 
officers “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the heads 
of Departments.” This, of course, hardly describes the civil service 
system, which might initially have been thought a regime just for 
clerks and similarly powerless employees,19 but which Congress also 
applied to powerful bureau chiefs.20 Appointment of the independent 
counsel by a special judicial tribunal survived in Morrison when the 
 
 16. 295 U.S. 602, 627-29 (1935). 
 17. If they had to be characterized in “branch” terms, all of the FTC‟s functions save 
perhaps reporting to Congress would today be recognized as “executive” in nature. 
 18. 487 U.S. 654, 663-67, 685-93 (1988). 
 19. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 483-85 (1886) (treating a naval cadet 
engineer as an inferior officer). 
 20. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS 9 
(1983). 
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majority found him an “inferior officer,” again on an analysis Justice 
Scalia found insupportable.  
Three years later, Freytag v. Commissioner21 put before the 
Court the appointment of a relatively minor quasi-judicial official of 
the Tax Court (a body established by Congress under Article I and not 
an Article III court). This official was held to be an “inferior officer” in 
constitutional terms, not merely a constitutionally unspoken to 
“employee,” because he exercised decisional authority. Justice 
Blackmun, for a bare majority, invoked an essentially originalist 
theme: given the Framers‟ apprehensions about “the most insidious 
and powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism,” the 
appointment power, the “heads of Departments” Congress could 
authorize to make appointments must be the heads of Cabinet-level 
departments. These departments, he reasoned, are “limited in number 
and easily identified. Their heads are subject to political oversight and 
share the President‟s accountability to the people.”  
Having announced this rationale—which the official in 
question escaped because the majority somehow associated his 
appointment with the “Courts of Law”—the Court appended a footnote 
as curious and muddling as the Humphrey’s Executor Court‟s denial 
that the FTC exercised executive branch functions: “We do not address 
here any question involving an appointment of an inferior officer by 
the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.”22 If one believes this footnote, 
what has become of the majority‟s historically grounded insistence 
that the authority granted by the constitutional text be limited to 
Cabinet-level departments, small in number, and to “heads of 
Departments” who share the President‟s accountability to the people? 
Justice Scalia (who has been heard by your author to describe Freytag 
as the single worst opinion of his incumbency) concurred for four. He 
rejected the majority‟s “Courts of Law” rationale and simply took the 
constitutionality of the FTC in particular (and the great variety of 
federal agencies in general) to have become established. History 
trumped originalism in this case; given all the congressional water 
that had been permitted to flow under the bridge, a return to the text 
would simply be too disruptive.23 If, dear reader, you are shaking your 
 
 21. 501 U.S. 868, 881-86 (1991). 
 22. Id. at 887 n.4. 
 23. One is reminded of a remarkable line from Justice White‟s dissent in another virtually 
impenetrable separation-of-powers case, N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U.S. 50, 94 (1982): “Whether fortunate or unfortunate, at this point in the history of 
constitutional law [the question what limits may exist on Congress‟s ability to create 
STRAUSS_GALLEY 10/2/2009 7:38 PM 
58 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC [Vol. 62:51 
head by this point, it may not surprise you to learn that Justice 
Scalia‟s opinion, for four only, is taken by all the PCAOB parties to 
represent what Freytag stands for.  
“Inferior officer” issues became somewhat clearer with Edmond 
v. United States,24 which permitted the Secretary of Transportation to 
appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard‟s Court of Criminal 
Appeals. Justice Scalia wrote for all but Justice Souter that “in the 
context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability 
relative to important government assignments, we think it evident 
that „inferior officers‟ are officers whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by presidential 
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The tension in 
this formulation, expanded on in the paragraphs below, was 
vigorously exploited by both of the lower court opinions in PCAOB, 
and is in an uneasy relationship to Morrison. One can read Judge 
Kavanaugh‟s dissent, in particular, as an invitation to the Court to 
overrule that case. 
And now, the PCAOB. The challenge to it faces preliminary 
obstacles that might appeal to a Court disinterested in further 
roiling—or clarifying—these murky waters. Perhaps the Court will 
conclude that petitioners have not exhausted their administrative 
remedies (because they brought this action as a facial challenge, 
perhaps attempting to force a resolution of the difficult constitutional 
issues in the abstract), that there has as yet been no “final” agency 
action that would be requisite for judicial review, or that the 
importance of unresolved and important questions of statutory 
meaning make the constitutional questions not yet ripe for judicial 
resolution.25  
 
adjudicative institutions to carry out federal policy that are not Article III courts] can no longer 
be answered by looking only to the constitutional text.” 
 Justice Scalia has expressed no great love for Humphrey’s Executor, even if he has accepted 
that this particular horse has long since left the proverbial barn. His dissent in Morrison, for 
instance, refers to Humphrey’s Executor as “gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or 
historical precedent for the novel principle it set forth, [the] carefully researched and reasoned 
70-page opinion” of Chief Justice Taft in Myers, 487 U.S. at 725-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Just 
this Term, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009), writing for himself 
and three others, he employed a grim simile identifying as “the lion‟s kill” the “power that 
Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive” via the creation of independent regulatory 
agencies, and recurred to Freytag in denying any “reason to magnify the separation-of-powers 
dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch.”  
 24. 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). 
 25. An earlier effort to raise similar separation-of-powers questions failed on these grounds 
at the court of appeals level by a vote of 3-0, but with each of the three deciding judges, 
strikingly, choosing a different one and rejecting both of the other two of these possible threshold 
rationales. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 732, 745, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
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But let us assume, as the essays to come almost certainly will, 
that the constitutional issues on which Judge Kavanaugh‟s dissent 
forcefully centered will prove decisive. Are the PCAOB‟s Members 
“principal officers” of the United States, whose appointment must, 
therefore, be made on presidential nomination and senatorial consent? 
Even if they are “inferior officers” of the United States, do the 
circumstances of the PCAOB violate the Constitution‟s arrangement 
for the appointment and removal of such officers because they are put 
entirely in the hands of the SEC, an independent regulatory 
commission, and thus beyond the effective reach of political (i.e., 
presidential) oversight?  
Here one easily sees the disconnect between the two halves of 
the sentence just quoted from Justice Scalia‟s opinion in Edmond. 
Freytag‟s originalist theme is preserved by “in the context of a clause 
designed to preserve political accountability relative to important 
government assignments”; but that theme does not so clearly live in 
“directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed 
by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 
The PCAOB easily meets the latter criterion. But, given the 
independence of the SEC, does it meet the thrust of the former? To 
relate this question to constitutional text: by creating one 
“independent” authority within another, has Congress discovered a 
way impermissibly to delegate important executive “duties” to officials 
who are beyond the President‟s effective ability to command an 
“Opinion, in writing” on the manner in which those duties will be 
exercised? That is, if we assume that the President is able to command 
such an opinion from the SEC (which in turn, like the Secretary of the 
Interior, can deal with its inferior officers), can he do so with the 
PCAOB? 
Those who take the strongest view of presidential authority 
read in the Constitution‟s text a commitment to a President who must 
be able to discipline any executive officer and whose powers include 
the right to command their performance of discretionary duty along 
the lines that he prefers. They may hope (as Judge Kavanaugh hinted 
he did) that the Court will reach as far back as Humphrey’s Executor 
and undo the mischief done to that view by permitting Congress to 
establish agencies whose heads can be removed only “for cause.” Or 
perhaps, resolving the tension in Edmond, the Court will conclude 
that the “heads of Departments” permitted to appoint and remove 
“inferior officers” must at the least be answerable to the President for 
their actions—alter egos he can himself remove at will. One could 
think such a conclusion is required to preserve “political 
accountability relative to important government assignments.” The 
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fact that Board Members‟ work is “directed and supervised at some 
level by others who were appointed by presidential nomination with 
the advice and consent of the Senate” would on this reading prove to 
be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of constitutionality.  
This condition might be satisfied if the authority to appoint and 
remove PCAOB heads were vested in a person, such as the SEC Chair 
(and the chairs of most independent regulatory commissions), whose 
tenure in that position—if not as a Commissioner per se—is subject to 
presidential termination at will. One might well think that Congress, 
in (typically) making the position of Chair subject to presidential 
termination at will, has been accommodating the demands of effective 
presidential oversight. Strikingly, this is the general position for the 
SEC—the Chair, and not the Commission, is formally responsible26 for 
the internal appointment and control of important officials such as 
bureau heads. But for the PCAOB, it is the Commission as a whole, 
not the Chair, that holds appointment and removal authority. Since 
the Commissioners are not removable at will, the effect is to double 
the level of “for cause” protection. 
Then there is possibly the question whether “for cause” has a 
constitutionally necessary minimum dimension—a question the Court 
has never yet had to answer, and that would perhaps serve us better 
resting in continued obscurity. Congress has usually not been so 
specific about what “cause” is to be. It was fairly specific in Morrison, 
but then (as may be evident) that opinion, already shadowed by 
Edmond, could well fall by the wayside in this case. The Court‟s 
current makeup is quite different than it was in 1988. And there are 
narrower possibilities. With respect to the PCAOB, Congress was 
unusually specific about what could constitute “cause” for a Board 
member‟s removal: to be established after notice and a hearing before 
the Commissioners, she must be shown “willfully” to have violated 
relevant law, “willfully” to have abused her authority, or “without 
reasonable justification or excuse, [to have] failed to enforce 
compliance with any such provision or rule, or any professional 
 
 26. A reorganization plan drawn up by President Truman, that in effect created the Chair‟s 
“chief executive” status, gave the Commissioners of the SEC authority over his appointments 
analogous to the Senate‟s power respecting the President‟s. That is, his appointment of “the 
heads of major administrative units under the Commission shall be subject to the approval of the 
Commission.” Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 § 1(b)(2), 64 Stat. 1265, 1266 (reproduced in 
the U.S. Code as an appendage to 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006)). The Chair is thus compelled to consult 
with the other four Commissioners—and, indeed, the small numbers and their continuing 
relationship must make those consultations in practice, quite meaningful; yet, wishing to keep 
his vulnerable leadership position, he must also consult with the President, who needs no one 
else‟s agreement to appoint a different Commissioner as chair. 
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standard.”27 Though, as the majority below observed, “willfully” is a 
term to be interpreted in the shadow of constitutional requirements, 
and a concrete occasion for testing the meaning of these provisions has 
not yet arisen, one could believe they give the SEC less room to 
remove Board members than the President has to remove 
Commissioners.  
Should the President demand an “Opinion, in writing” from the 
Commissioners of the SEC on a discretionary rulemaking28 pending 
before them, it is not difficult to imagine that he would be permitted to 
treat their refusal to comply as insubordination, constituting cause. 
But can he make such a demand of the PCAOB, or require the SEC to? 
And would the PCAOB‟s refusal to comply with such a request 
constitute “cause”? While Sarbanes-Oxley gives the SEC plenary after-
the-fact review authority over the merits of PCAOB actions of every 
kind, controls over its budget, etc., it does not appear as such to 
specify this kind of consultative role even for the Commission. If in 
practice, as appears to be the case, the SEC has on occasion demanded 
prior consultation in the course of approving PCAOB actions, would a 
Board refusal meet the statutory definitions of “cause” for removal? 
And even then, any such removal would come at the hand of the 
Commission, not the President. As petitioners emphasize, any 
oversight authority the President may have is only in relation to the 
SEC, and not to the PCAOB. The “second layer” of independence the 
PCAOB enjoys is a narrow way of understanding its arguable 
constitutional flaws, and it is at the heart of Judge Kavanaugh‟s 
strongest dissenting arguments. But, again, no one has yet tried to 
remove anyone, for any reason. 
Beyond the considerations of abstraction and prematurity 
already suggested, respondents can be expected to rely on the several 
ways in which Congress has granted the SEC power to control the 
PCAOB. They will certainly emphasize that how the SEC has been 
using its authority in relation to the PCAOB in practice is largely 
missing from the record, and that it seems rather more complete than 
the authority the SEC has been entrusted with over stock exchanges 
and the NASD for almost seven decades. For strong presidentialists, 
again, the problem here is that this is SEC authority, not presidential 
authority, and hence is disconnected from Article II‟s placement of the 
responsibility for seeing to the laws‟ faithful execution in the 
 
 27. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101(e)(6), 107(d)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(d)(3) 
(2006). 
 28. Put this way to eliminate the more difficult questions that would be presented by 
presidential efforts to consult about on-the-record adjudications, recognized as early as Myers. 
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President‟s hands. Is it a further constitutional problem that the SEC 
may not have a statutory obligation to supervise the PCAOB‟s 
preliminary actions—its decisions to investigate, to initiate 
disciplinary actions, etc.? Petitioners so argue; the government asserts 
and Judge Rogers concluded that the SEC could require its prior 
approval of decisions on investigation and enforcement. Moreover, it is 
perhaps here that the analogy to the self-regulatory organizations like 
FINRA will have its greatest purchase. They, too, are subject to 
complete SEC review of final actions, but not to decisions of this 
preliminary character. And the notion that the President‟s executive 
authority entails a capacity to control which individuals are 
investigated and prosecuted conveys a particularly dramatic view of 
his powers, one that may bring to mind the scandals of past “enemy 
lists” and other abuses of power a Court might hesitate to keep from 
Congress‟s protective control. 
Asked by the editors merely to set the table for the essays to 
follow, I venture no views on the merits of these issues, beyond 
asserting their difficulty and observing that the Republic has survived 
for a long time without their resolution. Somehow the case brings to 
mind a remark I heard attributed to Prof. Alexander Bickel, a 
passionate proponent of “the passive virtues,” and the man at whose 
feet I first encountered Administrative Law. Congratulated by a friend 
for his victory in the Pentagon Papers case, which he had briefed and 
argued, “Yes,” he replied, “victory is sweet. But there are some 
questions better left undecided.” 
 
